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Recent conflict between Belarus and Russia over the ban of Belarusian dairy products exported to 
Russia is clearly more than just a technical or economic dispute. In fact, Russia either does not have 
disputes with former USSR states or has exclusively politicized or military ones aimed at showing the 
insubordinate its dependence on Russia. Thus the present ‘economic discrimination‘ imposed on Belarus 
would not be so surprising if not the unprecedented rhetoric of both sides proving that neither side intends 
to give up. One can understand why Russia is waiting for an apology: it has never been the other way 
round. The question is, what gives A. Lukashenka so much self confidence in the face of harsh economic 
conditions and complete dependency on Russian energy resources. 
Some might think that the reason of such self assurance are Belarus’ improving relations with the 
West, the launch of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and A. Lukashenka’s hopes that Belarus can resort by 
leaning to the EU. Indeed, the EaP caused an ambiguous reaction in Russia. Moscow showed discontent 
and worries about the EaP, considering it as the new Trojan horse of the EU, but still officially continued 
to support  Belarus’  wish to take part  in the new program. Its concerns about the new program were 
repeatedly voiced by Sergei Lavrov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who declared in April: “We 
have listened to the statements from Brussels saying this is not a question of expanding the sphere of 
influence and that it is not a process which is directed at Russia. We would very much like to believe 
this”1. At the same time, Moscow was inciting the EU to invite Belarus to join the partnership. Sergei 
Prikhodko, presidential aide stated: “We are happy that realistic attitudes towards Belarus have gained the 
upper hand in Brussels”2. 
Economic argument might be one explanation of such ambiguous position. Belarus has been a 
burden for Russia since the collapse of USSR, any financial help coming from the West would lighten the 
weight on Russian shoulders. In July 2002, talking about reshaping economic agreements with Belarus, 
Putin stated that “there can be no attempts  to restore  the USSR at the expense of Russia’s economic 
interests”3 emphasizing Moscow’s inability to see any real  interest  in tightening economic links with 
Belarus. However, this argument should be discussed considering the low amount of funds planned to be 
1 Russia voices new concern over EU Eastern Partnership, http://www.eurobusiness.com/news-eu/1240927321.84, [04.28.2009]. 
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injected in Belarus by the EU, roughly 21 millions of euro, nothing compared to the Russian economic 
implication in the country. According to the official data of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic 
Of Belarus, 30.4% of the foreign direct investments, accounting for $1.160.8 million, were coming from 
the Russian Federation in 2007. Not to forget the $2 billion loan (3/4 of it has already been transferred, the 
last 500 million tranche has been delayed due to yet another dispute over the loan’s currency: Lukashenka 
prefers dollars whereas Russia seeks to commit Belarus to return the loan in Russian roubles). In short, 
Brussels’ announced help seems petty, Moscow has certainly no reason to be worried to lose its economic 
grip  on Belarus,  Belarus in  its  turn has no reason to believe EU can offer something comparable  to 
Russia’s support. 
Moreover, what might have appeared as a reason for Russia to be annoyed, can be considered as 
developments to its own advantage. Indeed, participation of Belarus in the Eastern Partnership initiative 
meant that Belarus will not recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The visit of the 
delegation lead by Head of the Presidential Administration of Belarus Uladzimier Makiej in Sukhumi on 
May 12-13 and the commitment of Belarus to establish future economic, social, cultural and humanitarian 
contacts with two breakaway states scattered the last possibility of their recognition by Belarus. 
However, by joining the partnership, Belarus and its government are recognized as the official 
interlocutor  of  European  institutions.  That  can  be  seen  as  favourable  to  Russia  since  weakening 
opposition’s  movements  will  thus  prevent the  -  extremely  low  -  risk  of  ‘coloured  revolution‘  and 
guarantee that the ruling regime in Minsk will not be too hostile to Russia, and will not drift away from its 
sphere of influence overnight. Then a bunch of issues are expected to rise in the near future if the EU 
wants the partnership to be a success: “The EaP anticipates a free trade zone, but before this can take 
place, its members must be members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Belarus is not a member of 
the WTO and has no immediate prospects of acceptance”4. Closely linked to the free trade zone issue, 
visas will  be problematic  as well.  The EaP customs control policy is  to clash with actual  agreement 
between Belarus and Russia. It stipulates that controls will eventually be transferred to the outside borders 
of the whole enlarged community whereas  Belarus  and Russia  formerly agreed  on abolishing border 
between them, and to draw their union’s limit in the west, on the edge of the EU. Furthermore, if the EaP 
could in theory lead Belarus to get involved in European energy security and defence initiatives too, it 
already has such relationships in place with Russia. Thus, because Russia’s ‘good-will’ will be essential 
4 David Marples, Belarus and the Dilemmas of Eastern Partnership, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?
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for the implementation and any future improvements of the EaP, Russia will surely acquire new political 
leverage in negotiations with the EU. Instead of observing the partnership from the outside, Moscow will 
have its Trojan horse in the organisation and might have to step in the program in the long run. Moreover, 
the absence of Presidents of the biggest EU countries also suggests the slight interest raised by the project 
among its main funders. Nicolas Sarkozy, Gordon Brown and Louis Rodriguez Zapatero were notably 
absent from the conference. All of these elements may lead Russia to believe the EaP won’t be more than 
a new kind of GUAM organization or Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, a talk shop 
unable of major achievements.
Therefore the EaP can not be considered neither as the single explanation of Russia’s anger nor the 
reason of A. Lukashenka’s self confidence. More probable explanation of Russia’s irritation would be its 
failed expectations to force integration processes of the Union state project in the face of the economic 
crisis and worsening economic and financial situation in Belarus. The disagreements between Russia and 
Belarus and disruptions in the creation of the common state began when V. Putin came to power in Russia 
determined to accelerate the unification processes. Since then the relations between to states were quite 
strained.  In  2004  there  was  a  gas  dispute  that  drew relatively  little  attention  from the  international 
community. The dispute was followed by a more notorious energy conflict in 2006. Then a number of 
upstarts and controversies related to the energy delivery and prices, “economic blockades”, disagreements 
over a number of issues in the process of the Union state’s creation (over Constitution, common currency). 
Belarus’ reluctance to recognize separatist  states in South Caucasus,  disinclination for a closer Union 
under  Russia’s  supremacy,  annoying  A.  Lukashenka’s  rhetoric  towards  high  Russian  officials, 
protectionist economic policies towards Russian import in Belarus (on tobacco, fish, alcohol and other 
products) and Belarus’ flirt with the West (the EaP initiative; recently European Council has given Belarus 
the status of a special guest), were the combination of factors that triggered recent annoyance. 
A. Lukashenka’s firm position may be explained by the fact that there is no pro-Russian politician 
in  Belarus  who  could  pose  a  serious  challenge  to  A.  Lukashenka.  Thus  the  speculations  about  A. 
Lukashenka’s post being at stake during this conflict are merely a bluff. However, Russia can otherwise 
punish Belarus: the hints about the possible ‘energy war’ are already flying. It was not difficult for A. 
Lukashenka to see that coming. But supposedly A. Lukashenka has made a great insight: Russia will 
anyway provide Belarus with energy resources, be they cheaper or not. Being insolvent Belarus will let its 
debt rise and Russia will have no other chance but to render a credit or delay the payments. Having that in 
mind the matter of fact can only be the price that Russia will set. And Belarusians are not beginners in the 
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negotiations  with  Russia  on  this  issue.  What  can  Russian  threaten  Belarus  that  Belarus  has  not  yet 
experienced and pulled through? Apparently knowing that gives the President of Belarus so much courage. 
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